Governments, central banks, and private companies make extensive use of expert and market-based forecasts in their decision-making processes. These forecasts can be a¤ected by terrorism, which should be considered by decision makers. We focus on terrorism, as a mostly endogenously driven form of political uncertainty, and use new econometric tests to assess the forecasting performance of market and professional in ‡ation and exchange-rate forecasts in Israel. We show that expert forecasts are better than market-based forecasts, particularly during periods of terrorism. However, forecasting performance and abilities of both market-based and expert forecasts are signi…cantly reduced during such periods. Thus, policymakers should be particularly attentive to terrorism when considering in ‡ation and exchange-rate forecasts.
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Introduction
In recent years, a rising number of researchers have shown interest in the economic consequences of terrorism, fuelled by the increase in terrorist attacks in highly developed countries that have traditionally been considered as safe. See, for example, Blomberg et al. (2004) , Crain and Crain (2006) , Dorsett (2013) , Gerlach and Yook (2016) , and Ruiz Estrada and Koutronas (2016) to name just a few.
Although there has been higher understanding of the real economic impact of terrorism, there is little evidence on the impact of terrorism on expectations. Given that the very de…nition of terrorism comes down to the aim to "intimidate or create panic," 1 omission of the more direct psychological impact that can be seen in the expectations seems problematic. Expectations play a pivotal role in the mechanism of state-of-the-art workhorse models of modern macroeconomics. Central banks, other policy makers, and other public and private institutions rely heavily on professional forecasts and market-implied expectations in their decision making.
2 Understanding how a climate of fear generated by terrorism a¤ects those expectations and forecasts is essential for proper policy making.
Thus, in this study, we aim to …ll this gap by using data on Israel, the developed country that has been plagued by far the most by terrorist activity.
There seems to be consensus in the literature that rare and infrequent terrorist attacks 3 have a limited direct and immediate economic impact on developed economies (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) .
However, persistent terrorism, as observed in Israel, might have a di¤erent e¤ect. 4 Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) show that in the absence of (regular) 1 According to Webster's New World Law Dictionary, the legal de…nition of terrorism is "the threat or actual use of violence in order to intimidate or create panic, especially when utilized as a means of attempting to in ‡uence political conduct." 2 See, for example, El-Shagi (2011) and El-Shagi et al. (2016) for a discussion on expectations and forecasts, respectively.
3 It is important to distinguish di¤erent types of terrorism: frequent at low intensity (Israel during the last decade), frequent at high intensity (Iraq and Syria), rare at low intensity (the United States during the last decade), and rare at high intensity (the United States on 9/11, the United Kingdom at London, and France at Paris and Nice). 4 Although our paper focuses on Israel, there are some general implications. It has been argued that there are di¤erences between the impact of terrorism on the Western countries and Israel because of the profound di¤erence between the terrorism that occurs in these countries. As terrorism is very frequent in Israel, one can foresee, anticipate, and model it, while terrorist attacks remain profoundly unpredictable (black swan) in the Western countries. However, in recent years this is no longer true, as the indexes of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom (Global Terrorism Index, Institute for Economics and Peace) have become very close to that of Israel. Moreover, fatalities caused by a terrorist attacks, such as the Second Intifada, Israel's per capita GDP would be higher than its actual GDP. For example, currently, house prices in Israel are considerably lower, especially in endangered regions (Elster et al., 2017) . Fielding (2003a) demonstrates that the First Intifada-which he interprets as a measure of political uncertainty-has contributed substantially to the low investment rate of Israel, and Fielding (2003b) shows a decline in the amount of investment.
Contrary to the previously mentioned contributions, our paper focuses on the impact of terrorism on expectations and forecasts. To this end, we assess expert forecasts on in ‡ation as well as the exchange rate and market expectations (implied by the price of in ‡ation-indexed bonds and forward exchange rate) in Israel. Before conducting a causal analysis, we will lay the foundation by performing a dynamic analysis of forecast rationality and (relative) forecast performance. Our assessment relies on the tests for (relative) forecast performance and forecast rationality proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2010) and Rossi and Sekhposyan (2016) , respectively, for unstable environments. Based on preliminary evidence gathered by the results of these tests and Giacomini and White (2006) , we conduct an explicit analysis of the causes of forecast performance.
Finally, we control for a range of other aspects of uncertainty and instability to ensure our results are not driven by an omitted variable bias. Speci…cally, we control for …nancial instability, commodity prices (particularly oil and gas), exchange rate ‡uctuations, and an econometric forecast of in ‡ation (exchange rate) uncertainty. Because the conditional relative performance test by Giacomini and White (2006) does not allow for control variables, we propose a slight modi…cation, turning the original correlationbased Wald test into a regression-based Wald test.
To our knowledge, our study is the …rst to conduct a broad analysis of how terrorism a¤ects forecast performance and, particularly, the …rst to compare several types of forecasts through di¤erent terrorism measures. We …nd that terrorism a¤ects market participants much more than professional forecasters. At least in the case of Israel, the average low performance of market participants seems to be driven mostly by terrorism. In addition, we …nd that terrorist attacks a¤ect not only the in ‡ation risk premium, but they also matter when in ‡ation forecasts adjusted for risks are considered. single terrorist attack have been higher in European countries compared with Israel over the last decade. Therefore, we explicitly distinguish between the frequency and magnitude of terrorist attacks. Other di¤erences do, of course, remain. Most importantly, Israel is much smaller than the aforementioned countries, so per capita terrorism is still unusually high for a developed country. Insofar, although the nature of terrorism in the West has changed, application of our results to other countries should be taken with a grain of salt.
Although our key research question is regarding the impact of terrorism on expectations, we also contribute to the growing literature comparing marketimplied forecasts and professional forecasts in general (Adeney et al., 2017) . Contrary to majority of the literature, we do so fully while accounting for the dynamics of forecast performance, which are commonly ignored.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stylized facts and related economic forecasts that are analyzed. Section 3 develops our methodology and econometric techniques used to quantitatively assess the impact of terrorist attacks on economic forecasts. The results are presented in Section 4 and interpreted in Section 5. In Section 6, we outline some policy implications of our …ndings. Section 7 concludes.
Background
Although there is reason to believe that terrorism might a¤ect expectations and thus forecasts, it seems that institutions making regular use of forecasts (such as central banks) ignore this channel.
While many previous studies analyze the impact of terrorism on current economic activity, few, if any, analyze the impact of terrorism on these essential economic forecasts. Unfortunately, Israel is an excellent laboratory in which to study this impact. Section 2.1 presents some stylized facts about terrorism, Section 2.2 describes the market-based and expert forecasts used in this study, and Section 2.3 details further control variables used for the analysis.
Terrorism and uncertainty
It is well known that major terrorist attacks (Keefer and Loayza, 2008; Roberts, 2009) , or continuous small and medium-sized terrorist attacks (Sandler and Enders, 2008; Benchimol, 2016) , a¤ect the economy. The negative impact of terrorism on short-term activities mainly results from the reallocation of internal demand for public consumption (such as insurance, security forces, and investments) to the detriment of more productive investments, causing growth to decrease (Blomberg et al., 2004) . Our purpose is to assess how these violent events a¤ect the bias and predictive abilities of experts as well as market-based forecasts. 5 5 We conducted di¤erent event studies without robust results. Daily variation in marketbased and expert forecasts cannot be explained using terrorism. The e¤ect of terrorism or …nancial uncertainty on expectations does not seem to be immediate but takes time to come about.
In the aftermath of 9/11 and with the rise of terror attacks in the European Union, there has been increasing interest in the economic consequences of terrorism (Crain and Crain, 2006; Dorsett, 2013; Gerlach and Yook, 2016; Ruiz Estrada and Koutronas, 2016) and the reasons behind it (Dreher and Gassebner, 2008; Dreher and Fischer, 2010) . In addition, linkages between terrorism and economic policy have been extensively analyzed Dreher and Fuchs, 2011) .
In 2001, when terrorists attacked the United States, the US economy was already in recession, but it reached positive growth only two months later. This led to the conclusion that even a major terrorist attack, such as the destruction of the World Trade Center, would have fairly limited economic consequences. Similarly, after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) , GDP growth trends of Spain and the United Kingdom were not a¤ected. Even the attacks in Paris (2015) did not show a measurable impact on French consumption. However, in almost all such cases, although the country is geographically or demographically large compared with the consequences of terrorism, expectations-including forecasts-were strongly a¤ected.
The emergence of a small, developed market economy in parallel with a terrorist con ‡ict provides an interesting economic example (Eldor and Melnick, 2004; Caruso and Klor, 2012) . Therefore, Israel is an excellent case study of a (small) developed country facing terrorism and war at di¤erent levels and frequencies (Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Larocque et al., 2010) .
In Unlike most terrorist attacks occurring in Europe or the United States, terrorist attacks in Israel (Fig. 1) have not involved substantial property or infrastructure destruction, except during the First and Second Intifada, but they have sometimes led to substantial casualties (Fig. 2) .
Nevertheless, terrorist attacks a¤ect consumers and investors' behavior and, in turn, stock market prices (Shoham et al., 2011) . When terrorists strike at almost regular intervals and fear and insecurity win minds and begin to change agents' economic behavior, the quality of economic (expert and market-based) forecasts would be a¤ected by these transitory events. The psychological e¤ects on expectations and feelings of uncertainty might be considerable, giving our study the unique ability to assess the impact of uncertainty, rather than the unforeseen e¤ects of negative shocks (Romanov et al., 2012) .
In this study, we use three sources of statistics on terrorist attacks to measure terrorism in Israel, each including four di¤erent indicators: number of people killed during terrorist attacks, number of people wounded during terrorist attacks, total number of casualties (killed and wounded) during terrorist attacks, and total number of terrorist attacks. We use one academic source (Global Terrorism Database, 7 available in the MFA data. These sources have their own methodology to account for terrorist attacks and casualties.
GTD data are generated by isolating an initial pool of potentially relevant articles and then using sophisticated natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning techniques to further re…ne the results, remove duplicate articles, and identify possibly relevant articles. The GTD team manually reviews this second subset of articles to identify unique events that satisfy the GTD inclusion criteria and subsequently researches and codes them according to GTD speci…cations. GTD data are reported separately for Israel (within the 1967 borders) and Gaza and the West Bank. To achieve better comparability, in particular with the MFA data, and to account for the fact that most attacks in Gaza and the West Bank target Israelis, we aggregate the two datasets. However, tests conducted with only Israel (within the 1967 borders) terrorism data lead to similar results.
MFA data are from the chronology of terrorist attacks in Israel published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign A¤airs and collected by Johnston (2016) . MFA data include the West Bank and Gaza in their de…nition of Israel. NII data are from the national social security services. These data include terrorist attacks involving Israelis all over the world, without geographical distinction. That is, contrary to our other sources (GTD and MFA), terrorist attacks outside Israel are considered.
Although during periods of high terrorism, there were months with very few or no terrorist casualties or attacks (e.g., February and July 2003 saw roughly 10 people injured at a time when most months saw …gures going into the hundreds), we use a backward-looking (12 months) moving average for all terrorism indicators because …nancial data and turmoil are inherently persistent. The moving average accounts for high volatility by correctly identifying the respective months as part of periods with high instability.
Market and expert forecasts
Israel is the only highly developed country with sound economic institutions and fully developed …nancial markets (and thus access to very detailed economic information) to have experienced a long history of terror. Particularly interesting for us are market expectations and professional forecasts. Since Israel issues both in ‡ation-indexed and non-indexed bonds, it is straightforward to compute market expectations of in ‡ation (breakeven in ‡ation rates).
As a measure of professional forecasts, we use the combined professional forecast assembled by the Bank of Israel.
Expert as well as market-based in ‡ation and exchange-rate forecasts are essential when formulating the in ‡ation-targeting monetary policy of a small open economy. Thus, the Bank of Israel collects an excellent set of forecasts that are updated regularly.
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In line with this practice of the Bank of Israel, we use the forecasts as given without further risk adjustment. Although this implies that our measures are not perfect measures of expectations, it guarantees that they are perfect measures of policymakers' perception of expectations, which is more essential. However, we do control for in ‡ation risk and exchange-rate risk to ensure that our results are not driven by lack of risk adjustment.
Policy Committee (MPC): the 1Y Forward (contract) implied in ‡ation forecast and the 1Y Breakeven (zero-coupon bond implied) in ‡ation forecast. The …rst is the instantaneous 1Y forward in ‡ation rate, and the second is reported by the Bank of Israel as the o¢cial 1Y market-based in ‡ation forecast.
11 These time series are not transformed and used as they are in the MPC.
In addition, the Bank of Israel collects a series of forecasts provided by professional forecasters, giving an excellent overview of the professional in‡ation expectations. Contrary to many other surveys, individual forecasters are not asked for their opinions at a given point in time, but they are able to update their forecasts at will, thereby essentially giving us daily data on professional forecasts. Expert forecasts used in this study are computed as the simple arithmetic mean of the in ‡ation forecasts of commercial banks and economic consulting companies. This measure, as well as the 1Y Breakeven in ‡ation forecast, are reported in o¢cial publications of the Bank of Israel.
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The situation is equally good for exchange rates. There is an active future ILS/USD market that allows us to infer market expectations for the exchange rate. Given their importance, exchange rates are covered by the Bank of Israel's in-house survey of forecasters.
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The forecasts are obtained for the last day of the month. Variables used to explain forecast performance are from the month when the forecast is made. Thus, they can a¤ect the forecast and do not just appear as a forecast error by occurring after the forecast is made.
A detailed description of the performance of the in ‡ation and exchange rate forecasts is provided in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Further control variables
Market expectations and professional forecasters could respond to …nancial uncertainty.
14 Then, we employ three di¤erent measures of volatility to serve as control variables. First, we use the monthly standard deviation of daily returns (approximated as log di¤erences) of the relevant stock market index, that is, the TA-100 index, which is one of the broadest leading indexes in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.
15 Second, we include the spread between the highest and lowest levels of this index within the month of the forecast. Third, we consider the monthly average of the corresponding daily spreads. While the monthly spread reacts more strongly to major movements within a month, the average daily spread implicitly gives higher weight to intraday ‡uctuations. In addition, since terrorism in Israel might be related to unrest in the Middle East as a whole, which has serious repercussions for the price of oil, a major factor in global economic development, we control for commodity price volatility. More precisely, in our empirical analysis, we control for the monthly volatility (standard deviation of daily log di¤erences) of crude oil, 16 natural gas, 17 and CRB commodity price index 18 expressed in ILS and USD (Fig. 4) .
Finally, we control for the volatility of the USD/ILS exchange rate, again computed as the standard deviation of daily log di¤erences over one month.
14 The global …nancial crisis and subsequent recovery period provided new insights about forecast evaluation during the period of data instability in both the Eurozone (Benchimol and Fourçans, 2017) and the United States (Caraiani, 2016) , as well as in Israel (Benchimol, 2016) . 15 The TA-100 index consists of 100 shares with the highest market capitalization and includes the TA-25 and TA-75 indexes. 16 West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil spot price, US dollars per barrel, not seasonally adjusted.
17 Henry Hub natural gas spot price, US dollars per million British Thermal Unit (BTU), not seasonally adjusted. 18 Thomson Reuters Core Commodity Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) index. 
Methodology
While early literature on forecast evaluation usually evaluated forecast performance for the entire sample, the past decade has seen the emergence of literature on forecast evaluation in unstable environments, which allows accounting for situations such as those described in Section 2. These new tests allow us to assess time variation in both the performance of individual forecasts and relative performance of forecasts, as well as to account for the fact that some models and/or forecasters might shine in some situations, but not in others. Some tests involved are essentially supremum versions of established tests over a rolling window of forecasts. This introduces a multiple testing problem that causes the critical values of those tests to be much higher than those of the underlying individual tests. If there is no ‡uctuation, this of course causes an unnecessary loss in power. Thus, the tests are often accompanied by full sample versions. However, since most of our results indicate strong rejection, we omit reporting these full sample tests in this paper.
Unbiasedness in unstable environments
We start the analysis with the most fundamental question, that is, whether the forecasts we consider are unbiased. Rossi and Sekhposyan (2016) suggested using the maximum of rolling-window Wald-type unbiasedness tests as the test statistic. Thus, the null hypothesis is that the forecast under consideration is rational at any point in time during the sample. Rejection does not imply that a forecast is permanently biased, but that it was biased at least once during the sample period. Following the original research, we report the entire time series of underlying individual test statistics to obtain a visual representation of which periods cause the rejection. We apply the same strategy for other related tests.
The underlying test statistic is based on a standard Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) regression:
where y t+h is the variable of interest at t + h,ŷ t+h;t is the corresponding forecast made at time t, and t;h is the residual of the test regression. The traditional test for unbiasedness examines the joint hypothesis that = 0 and = 1. It is straightforward to observe (as pointed out, for example, by West and McCracken (1998) ) that this can be rearranged so that the h step-ahead forecast error at time t,^ t;h = y t+h ŷ t+h;t , becomes the left-hand side variable:^
where 0 and 1 are the regression coe¢cients of the adjusted test equation.
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This gives us the more approachable null hypothesis = [ 0 ; 1 ] = 0, which can be easily assessed with a standard Wald test using the test statistic:
where^ is the estimator of and^ is the corresponding heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) robust estimator of the covariance matrix of .
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With a sample of P forecasts and using window length m, the proposed test statistic takes the following form:
Because of the rolling-window nature of the underlying individual Wald tests, the distribution of this test statistic under the null hypothesis asymptotically converges to a function of Brownian motions. The precise distribution depends on whether the uncertainty in the parameter estimates in the forecasting model itself should be accounted for (i.e., not the uncertainty concerning but the degree of uncertainty in the parameters used to generatê y). In the case of expert or market-based forecasts, the so-called model-free forecasts, the distribution under the null collapses to its most simple form, depending asymptotically only on m=P and not the sample size used to produce forecasts.
Stability of relative forecast performance 3.2.1 Fluctuation test
Much like the test for unbiasedness in unstable environments is a maximum of individual unbiasedness test statistics over a rolling window, the test for relative forecast performance in unstable environments proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2010) is the maximum of traditional relative forecast performance tests over a rolling window.
Similar to the previous test, the null hypothesis is that the forecasts under consideration perform equally well at any point in time. Exceeding the critical value does not imply that one model constantly outperforms the other, but merely that there is a meaningful di¤erence in the predictive ability for a subsample.
More precisely, the test statistic is the maximum of local Diebold and Mariano (1995) test statistics, in which the variance estimator is based on the full sample of forecasts, rather than the individual window for which the mean di¤erence in predictive ability is computed. Since the full sample estimator is used in this approach, m can be much smaller than in the previously outlined test. This is because the rationality test needs m to be su¢ciently large to allow meaningful estimation of , which corresponds to in this test, within the rolling window, which is not relevant here. Denoting the loss function for the two forecasts under consideration at time t by L 1;t;h and L 2;t;h and the corresponding loss di¤erence by L t;h = L 1;t;h L 2;t;h , we can write the test statistic as max j2fm;:::;P g
where^ is the HAC robust estimator of the standard error of the mean of L t;h . Again, the critical values are, asymptotically, functions of Brownian motions. Since the …nite sample bias in the test for unbiasedness under instability is mostly introduced by the uncertainty in the estimation of over m observations, the …nite sample problems are far less pronounced in this test, and we use the asymptotic critical values provided by Giacomini and Rossi (2010) .
The test we use is two sided, because there is no valid prior assumption on the superiority of one forecast over another. For the visual interpretation, we 14 report that^
L t , rather than the corresponding absolute, which is part of the test-statistic, to observe whether the rejection is driven by forecast 1 or 2 to be superior during a subsample.
One-time reversals in forecast performance
Often, a potential change in forecast performance is due to a single structural break (e.g., introduction of a new forecasting model or policy that is not well understood by one forecasting agent), rather than ‡uctuations over time. In this case, the very ‡exible framework outlined above still creates an unnecessary loss in power, compared with a test that explicitly models a single structural break.
Thus, Giacomini and Rossi (2010) proposed a so called one-time reversal test, which follows the spirit of the supremum structural break tests introduced by Hawkins (1987) .
Technically, the test includes a testing procedure composed of three separate tests.
The …rst test statistic is a straightforward full sample test:
The second is the actual structural break statistic based on the loss differences in various subsamples:
where
Finally, the joint test-statistic with the null hypothesis of equal performance at any point in time is as follows:
Correspondingly, if the third test statistic is rejected, we can reject equal performance at every point in time. Only then do we assess the individual underlying statistics LM 1 and LM 2 . If only LM 1 is rejected, this indicates the permanent superiority of one model. If only LM 2 is rejected, this indicates the reverse, in which one model is superior only for a certain subsample. If both tests are rejected, then the interpretation is not as clear cut, but it generally implies some change in relative performance that is not strong enough to a¤ect the relative order of forecasts. If there is evidence of a structural break, the most likely breakpoint is j = argmax j2f0:15P;:::;0:85P g LM 2 (j).
Encompassing in unstable environments
Even if one forecast is permanently or temporarily better, this does not necessarily imply that the superior forecast fully exploits the available information at all times. Thus, we move to the next step and test the forecast encompassing in the same framework, proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2010) , which we used to assess rationality. The key di¤erence is that the equation underlying the Wald test changes to a standard encompassing equation given bŷ 1;t;h = 0 + 1 (^ 1;t;h ^ 2;t;h ) + t;h (10) where^ 1;t;h and^ 2;t;h are the forecast errors of models 1 and 2, respectively. Contrary to the test for unbiasedness, we are merely interested in 1 . Thus, the individual Wald statistics collapse to
where! is the lower right element of^ and^ 1 is the estimator of 1 .
Conditional relative performance
After exploring time variation in forecast performance and, more importantly, relative performance, we now assess the reasons for the variation. To that end, we employ the test for conditional forecast performance proposed by Giacomini and White (2006) . Denoting the set of conditions that potentially explain the di¤erence in performance at time t by row vector h t , the test statistic is once again a Wald-type statistic given by
This statistic is a standard Wald statistic in which the individual coef…cients are bilateral correlations between the elements of h t and L.^ is the corresponding HAC robust estimator of the covariance matrix. The test 16 statistic follows a simple 2 q distribution, in which q is the number of elements in h t .
The null hypothesis is that forecast performance is not related to any indicator collected in h t . The explanatory variables are usually, and in our example, measured at time t rather than at t + h; that is, we do not assess which kind of shock at t + h is unforeseeable for certain forecasters, but we assess conditions at t when the forecast is made. To a certain degree, this allows us to choose the preferred forecast, ex ante, that is, when the forecast is made, rather than later when the realization is known.
It must be noted that including several indicators in h t does not "control" for indicators in the sense of regression analysis, since the coe¢cients are simple bilateral correlations rather than regression coe¢cients. However, we also want to assess whether terrorism truly has an impact that is not related to …nancial market uncertainty. Nonetheless, due to the aforementioned construction, performing a Wald test on only one coe¢cient estimated jointly with others merely yields a result that is obtained when testing this individual explanatory variable without controlling for further indicators.
Therefore, we also run an ad hoc variation of this test, in which we use regression coe¢cients rather than correlation coe¢cients and the corresponding covariance matrix, and we run a Wald test on the coe¢cient(s) of interest only.
Results
This section presents the results for tests related to the CPI in ‡ation and the USD/ILS exchange rate, as well as expert and market-based forecasts.
In ‡ation
Unbiasedness Our test for unbiasedness in unstable environments strongly rejects both expert forecasts and market-implied in ‡ation expectations (Fig.  5) .
Since the null hypothesis of the underlying test is that the forecast is always unbiased, this does not imply a bias on average or even for majority of the periods. A visual inspection of the time series of the individual Wald statistics that underlie the (supremum) test statistic used indicates that, in both cases, the rejection is primarily driven by a strong bias between 2008Q4 and 2010Q3, and following 2012Q4.
The earlier of the two periods corresponds to both substantial fears However, these movements would be su¢cient for rejection by expert forecasts based on this period alone. Even this preliminary evidence, based on rationality tests, lends quite strong support to our main hypothesis; that is, uncertainty and instability of any form, whether …nancial or-as in the unfortunate case of Israel-caused by terrorism, strongly a¤ects expectations and thereby forecasts.
Relative forecast performance and encompassing Both expert and market-based in ‡ation forecasts are strongly a¤ected by uncertainty, and the order of magnitude seems similar. Although a ‡uctuation test that assesses the null hypothesis of equal forecast performance at any point in time is rejected, this rejection is exclusively driven by the early period of the sample, when expert surveys hugely outperformed market expectations. Fig. 6 shows development of the underlying individual test statistics over time, indicating another extended period of superior survey forecasts in the second half of the 2000s; however, the test statistics are far below the critical value.
21 At other times, the performance of both forecasts is essentially identical. The magnitude of the ‡uctuations is small enough that we cannot rule out a single structural break in relative forecast performance around 2004, as indicated by the one-time reversal test.
The encompassing test (Fig. 7) paints a clearer picture. Again, we clearly reject that the typically superior survey forecasts encompass market forecasts. These rejections are essentially driven by the very same periods that drive the results of our rationality test. That is, while both experts and market participants are strongly a¤ected by uncertainty, they are a¤ected in very di¤erent ways, which leads to the natural follow-up question: can uncertainty indeed explain the di¤erences in forecast performance?
Conditional relative forecast performance The core question in our study is whether terrorist attacks a¤ect the (relative) performance of expert values of the test statistic indicate worse performance of market-based forecasts and corresponding superiority of the expert forecasts. and market-based forecasts. All indicators of terrorism we use turn out to be signi…cant at the 5% level.
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To assess the robustness of those results, beyond the inclusion of a range of di¤erent indicators, we test speci…cations controlling for the alternative reasons for time-varying forecast performance that might be correlated to terrorism.
23 First, we include several indicators of …nancial stability (Fig.  3) . Terrorism might cause market turbulence that in turn a¤ects economic forecasts, just as …nancial turmoil might do when caused by any other source.
Second, we include commodity price volatility as well as USD/ILS volatility. Since terrorism in Israel might be related to instability in the Middle East, where several main producers of oil are located, there might be a relationship between in ‡ation forecasts and commodity prices volatility. The latter are known to have a major in ‡uence on world economy and, speci…cally, on Israel, which is a small open economy and was an oil and gas importer before developing its own natural gas resources. Tables 1 and 2 present detailed results of conditional predictive ability tests (CPA) when considering the joint test of both market and expert in ‡a-tion forecasts against control variables.
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All our indicators of terrorism are individually signi…cant. In particular, we …nd that market forecasts deteriorate more strongly in times of high terrorism compared with expert forecasts. As mentioned in Section 3, the test proposed by Giacomini and White (2006) does not control for multicollinearity even when including several variables simultaneously. However, our modi…ed test, which relies on regression coe¢cients rather than correlations for the underlying Wald test statistics, still rejects indicators for terrorism after including …nancial uncertainty, USD/ILS, or commodity price changes as control variables. The only exception is the number of attacks, as measured by GTD, since in most cases, we …nd signi…cance for neither the number of attacks nor the additional control, but we do …nd individual signi…cance for the number of attacks, without additional controls, and joint signi…cance. We achieve the best results when using NII indicators, particularly-and surprisingly-the number of attacks as measured by NII.
Most alternative indicators of uncertainty, that is, …nancial indicators and commodity prices, seem to play a role when assessed individually, but they are not that robust. While we …nd that most indicators still seem signi…cant for some terrorism indicators, those results are not stable and strongly depend on the terrorism indicator chosen. The only exception is gas price volatility, which remains signi…cant in all regressions. However, in all those cases, the corresponding terrorism indicator is still signi…cant, again with the exception of the number of attacks, as reported by GTD. Based on the overwhelming robustness of our …ndings for 10 out of 11 terrorism indicators, we …nd fairly strong evidence that terrorism matters for relative forecast performance. 25 It seems plausible that the number of terrorist attacks, as measured by 24 A detailed description of control variables representing …nancial instability (volatility and spreads) is provided in Section 2.3. 25 Other results are available upon request. These tests were conducted for the price levels and volatilities of both ILS and USD, as well as while considering a moving average (12 months) for the control variable. All results con…rm that terror is the best explanatory variable of in ‡ation forecasts errors. 
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NII, is the most powerful predictor of forecast accuracy. This result might be related to the great importance forecasters and markets give to frequency compared with severity of terrorist attacks (Pizam and Fleischer, 2002) . Since the outcome of an attack in terms of casualties is much more stochastic than its occurrence, it makes perfect sense that people respond to the number of attacks, regardless of whether the terrorists claimed many victims; yet, this seems to be contradicted by the poor performance of the number of attacks, as measured by GTD. This might be driven by the screening methodology of GTD (text mining methodology), which can easily cause minor attacks to be excluded, thereby creating a more noisy measure of the number of attacks, while still being very accurate in terms of victims. Similarly, the good performance of gas price volatility is hardly surprising, given the role natural gas production has played for Israel in the last few years. Interestingly, this indicates that uncertainty concerning external conditions (oil and commodity prices) is far less important than factors that might actually a¤ect production in Israel directly (e.g., gas prices and terrorism).
Forecast error vs. mismeasurement of expectations Technically, neither of the market-based measures we use is a pure measure of in ‡ation unless we assume risk-neutral investors. Rather, breakeven in ‡ation corresponds to the in ‡ation expectation plus an in ‡ation risk premium. If the e¤ect of terrorism were increasing uncertainty, for example, in terms of the political response, this might easily create in ‡ation risk. If agents were risk averse, this would a¤ect breakeven in ‡ation. Even if the accuracy of market expectations were to remain unchanged, the forecast performance of breakeven in ‡ation rates might thereby deteriorate, as they are no longer an accurate measure of expectations.
In this section, we test whether the relative deterioration of breakeven in ‡ation from the sovereign bond market compared with professional forecasters is driven by this mismeasurement. To this end, we generate a measure of in ‡ation uncertainty that accounts for the potential impact of terrorism. We estimate a recursive window, pseudo out-of-sample generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) forecast of year-over-year in ‡ation. Both the variance of shocks and the process itself are modeled as an autoregressive moving average model (ARMA)(1,1) process. In addition, we include terrorism as an exogenous determinant of shocks. sured by our GARCH has a robust and sizable impact on the relative forecast performance, terrorism remains robust in explaining relative predictive ability. In other words, our results are twofold. (a) It seems that terrorism truly a¤ects the predictive ability of market participants. Even when accounting for risk, we …nd that terrorism matters. (b) Nevertheless, there is evidence that in ‡ation risk matters. This indicates that market participants are far from risk neutral. This makes using breakeven in ‡ation rates as a substitute for forward-looking measures of in ‡ation in policymaking even more problematic.
Exchange rate
Unbiasedness Regarding unbiasedness, results for the USD/ILS exchange rate are fairly similar to those for in ‡ation. Fig. 8 shows that our test for unbiasedness in unstable environments strongly rejects both expert forecasts and market-implied exchange rate (USD/ILS) expectations. These rationality tests support the conclusion that terrorism strongly a¤ects expectations and, thereby, expert and market-based forecasts.
Relative forecast performance and encompassing Like in ‡ation, expert and market-based exchange-rate forecasts are a¤ected by uncertainty of a similar order of magnitude. Neither the ‡uctuation test (Fig. 9) nor the one-time reversal test rejects, 29 even at the beginning of the period (Second Intifada). This con…rms that at any point in time, expert and market-based forecast performances are fairly similar (with a con…dence interval of 5%). Fig. 9 shows the dynamics of the underlying individual test statistics over time. There is some indication that expert forecasts were superior at the beginning of the sample, yet the test statistics are far below the critical value. Between 2005Q1 and 2008Q4, market-based forecasts were slightly superior to expert forecasts. Contrary to in ‡ation forecasts (Section 4.1), the period in which exchange-rate, market-based forecasts were superior to expert forecasts (2005Q1-2008Q4) corresponds to a relatively calm period. The two transition points between superiority of market-based and expert forecasts occurred in very speci…c periods. The …rst period corresponds to strong fears involving the victory of the militant Islamic group Hamas in the elections for the second Palestinian Legislative Council, and the second corresponds to Operation Cast Lead (2008Q4-2009Q1) . While the …rst period heralded increasing fears in and around Israel 30 (switching from the superiority of expert forecasts to superiority of market-based forecasts), the second to report losses. The real trigger for the crisis was in 2007Q3, when the French bank BNP Paribas temporarily suspended redemptions from three of its fund holdings that had invested in assets backed by the US subprime mortgage debt. As a result, credit spreads began widening, interest rates in Europe shot up overnight, and the European Central Bank immediately responded with the largest short-term liquidity injection in its nine-year history (Benchimol and Fourçans, 2017) . 28 At the end of 2009, the three main rating agencies downgraded Greece's credit rating, and during the …rst two quarters of 2010, three austerity packages were announced by the Greek government. These decisions, also known as a cause of the European Debt Crisis, strongly impacted the Eurozone, Israel's main trade partner (Benchimol, 2016) . 29 Tests reported in Fig. 9 use squared forecast errors as a loss function. Performance di¤erences are de…ned as market-based loss less expert (survey)-based loss. Thus, high values of the test statistic indicate worse performance of market-based forecasts and the corresponding superiority of expert forecasts. event promised a period of increasing stability 31 (switching from the superiority of market-based forecasts to superiority of expert forecasts). Operation Pillar of Defense (2012Q4) contributed to the deterioration of expert forecasts relative to market-based forecasts. The encompassing test (Fig. 10) highlights the clear rejection that the typically superior survey forecasts encompass market forecasts. However, these rejections are not driven by the same periods that drive the results of our rationality test. Instead, we reject encompassing fairly consistently over time. This indicates that-for the exchange rate-markets constantly monitor and include factors that are not properly accounted for by professionals. While this does not contradict our hypothesis regarding the importance of terrorism, it does not provide support for it either.
Conditional relative forecast performance Interestingly, although the initial tests provide only weak evidence for ‡uctuations in relative forecast performance, the tests for conditional forecast performance have di¤erent implications.
Generally, the results are not quite as clear as they were for in ‡ation. While some conditional predictive ability tests reject some terrorism indi- cators at the 10% level, we fail to reject them in other cases. The picture changes when accounting for other sources of uncertainty. While the joint test now generally fails to reject the indicators because we add a less powerful indicator, the individual t-tests for the terrorism indicators indicate consistent rejections.
We …nd again that both terrorism and …nancial uncertainty explain variations in the exchange rate's (USD/ILS) relative forecast performance. In particular, we …nd that market forecasts deteriorate more strongly in times of uncertainty compared with expert forecasts. We …nd evidence that terrorism truly matters for relative forecast performance, and the e¤ect of …nancial uncertainty becomes insigni…cant when controlling for terrorism. Neither oil nor gas price ‡uctuations play a major role.
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Given that the variation in forecast performance is well explicable (not random), we believe that it is the lack of power of the ‡uctuation test in small samples, rather than the constant relative performance, that causes us to fail to reject the null hypothesis. Table 3 presents detailed results of the CPA tests when considering the joint test of both market and expert USD/ILS forecasts against control variables 33 . Table 3 indicates that the USD/ILS forecast performance is strongly related to terrorism data. Surprisingly, the NII data now seem clearly less powerful in explaining forecast performance. In particular, the number of attacks, which outperformed all other measures for in ‡ation, is now completely void of predictive power. On the contrary, the number of people killed now plays a major role. The reason might be that-by constructionthe exchange market is much more a¤ected by international traders than the Israeli bond market is. Due to the large number of attacks in Israel, terrorism without casualties barely receives international recognition these days. This might explain why the number of casualties (i.e., people killed in attacks) is much more important for the exchange market.
As terrorism has a clear and identi…ed impact on …nancial and real asset markets (Zussman et al., 2008; Elster et al., 2017) , our …nding adds to the literature by showing that terrorism has a substantial impact on forward markets involving a signi…cant predictive power loss. Table 3 shows that the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) spread, oil volatility in USD and ILS, and CRB volatility in USD t-tests are generally negative over all our terrorism indicators, indicating that expert forecasts, relative to market forecasts, deteriorate in times of uncertainty (i.e., when the terrorism indicator's t-test is high). These detailed results highlight that forecasters are insigni…cantly better than 1Y Breakeven market-based in‡ation forecasts, but forecasters are signi…cantly better than 1Y Forward market-based in ‡ation forecasts. 34 
Interpretation
In ‡ation expert forecasts are superior to market-based forecasts during periods of high uncertainty. The result is qualitatively similar for exchange rate forecasts. In both cases, we …nd strong evidence that it is indeed terrorism, rather than related phenomena (e.g., commodity price ‡uctuations and …-nancial distress), that triggers changes in forecast performance. Moreover, we …nd in both cases that market forecasts deteriorate more strongly.
These results are not surprising. As terrorist attacks a¤ect agents' behavior, market and economic expectations change accordingly. Expert and 33 A detailed description of control variables representing …nancial instability (volatility and spreads) is provided in Section 2.3. 34 This result is mostly driven by the earliest part of our sample (Second Intifada market forecasts are then a¤ected in several ways. First, such changes increase forecasting bias and errors. The drastic impact of terrorism seriously a¤ects perceptions of market players and forecasters, which in turn impact their implied forecasts. Second, such events substantially a¤ect the predictive ability of these forecast providers and their updates following the events, at least for the Israeli in ‡ation and exchange rate (USD/ILS) forecasts. However, the impact on relative performance indicates that there is more to the story: there is an additional fundamental variable that adds some uncertainty. It seems that these events disturb the ability of market participants considerably more than they a¤ect professional forecasters. Again, this is hardly surprising. It makes sense that market participants, in a wider sense, are more a¤ected by the psychological impact of uncertainty than are experimented professionals.
Interestingly, …nancial uncertainty is not signi…cant when controlling for terrorism, although terrorism remains robustly signi…cant when controlling for …nancial uncertainty. In other words, terrorism has a major role in both expert and market-based forecasts' bias and predictive ability. Interpreting these forecasts without considering the current terrorism situation could lead to severe mistakes for decision makers.
In line with the recent literature about the impact of oil prices on the US, French, and UK in ‡ation forecasts (Badel and McGillicuddy, 2015; Bec and De Gaye, 2016) , for Israel, we show that exchange rate volatility and commodities volatility matter in explaining in ‡ation forecast errors (without considering terrorism data). However, our results suggest that in the case of Israel, terrorism has a strong explanatory power for both expert and marketbased error forecasts compared with other control variables (Section 2.3).
Exchange-rate forecasts are signi…cantly impacted by terrorism as well as natural gas price volatility. This link is a consequence of the three ways in which natural gas has in ‡uenced the Israeli economy since the 2000s. In the late 1990s, the Israeli government decided to encourage the use of natural gas for several reasons (environmental, cost, and resource diversi…cation). From 2000 to 2016, Israeli natural gas consumption multiplied more than 10-fold (from 0.01 to 0.12 quadrillion BTU). Thus, Israel became an important natural gas consumer. At the same time, several natural gas reserves were discovered in Israel, making Israel one of the 30 natural gas-exporting countries in the world in 2016. Before this, Israel acquired natural gas through Egyptian pipelines in the Sinai Peninsula, which were frequently targeted by terror organizations (e.g., during the August 2012 Sinai attacks). The prominent link between natural gas price volatility and USD/ILS forecasts resides in the Bank of Israel's program to o¤set the e¤ects of natural gas production on the foreign exchange rate by purchasing foreign currency.
Another layer was added to the Bank of Israel's exchange rate policy in May 2013, following rapid appreciation of the nominal e¤ective exchange rate of ILS (about 11.5% between September 2012 and May 2013). At the beginning of the process, the appreciation was in ‡uenced by the geopolitical situation, due to the dissipation of tension prevalent at the beginning of the period. As the start date for natural gas production from the Tamar site drew closer, the foreign exchange market started to price the expected return from dozens of years of natural gas production. The Bank of Israel reacted by launching its natural gas o¤set program.
These three factors are strongly related to imported in ‡ation and the exchange rate (USD/ILS). As the Bank of Israel tried to o¤set ILS appreciation due to natural gas production and exports, natural gas price volatility became a robust control variable, considering Israeli in ‡ation as well as USD/ILS exchange-rate forecasts.
As mentioned before, the implied market forecasts are actually a combination of market expectations and risk premia. 35 While we aim to control for that e¤ect, we can only partly do so; that is, we can account for the in‡ation risk itself (Section 4.1). Other factors that might be a¤ected in times of economic uncertainty such as liquidity risk have to be omitted due to lack of data.
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Policy implications
The Bank of Israel, as with any other developed country's central bank, uses market-based as well as expert forecasts to implement and justify its own forecasts used for monetary policy decisions. 37 These forecasts are also of prime importance because of their utilization: they are presented and discussed by the MPC and by decision makers and institutions in Israel and abroad (e.g., the International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank). From a policy perspective, it is thus of minor importance whether our market forecasts are 35 Including the liquidity premium re ‡ecting the di¤erent liquidity of nominal and in ‡ation-linked government bonds. 36 Greater war risks narrow the breakevens and a¤ect many other …nancial asset prices (Rigobon and Sack, 2005) . Narrowing of the US breakevens during the global …nancial crisis represented an investor preference for the liquidity of nominal government bonds (Fleckenstein et al., 2014; P ‡ueger and Viceira, 2016) . The di¤erence between forward exchange-rates and actual physical expectations (foreign exchange risk premium) could also represent compensation for facing disaster risk (Farhi et al., 2009) 
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truly forecasts in the original sense of the word. What matters is that they are treated as such by policymakers despite their shortcomings. Our results show that using or interpreting these forecasts (expert and market-based), without considering terrorism in Israel can cause an incorrect perception of their current predictive power. Underestimating forecast errors and correspondingly overestimating predictive ability could lead to severe over-reliance on the wrong forecasts.
Consequently, when establishing their in ‡ation and exchange rate projections, these institutions and decision makers should interpret expert and market-based forecasts di¤erently, conditional on the current level of terrorism. For example, during 2008Q4-2010Q3, these institutions should have considered a persistent and robust bias in expert and market-based forecasts of in ‡ation.
38
While prior literature and policy discussions have considered economic factors that impact in ‡ation expectations (and thus, the forward-looking estimates of the in ‡ation gap), these factors (e.g., …nancial instability and commodity prices) have not included terrorism despite their seeming far more important.
The same argument holds true for exchange-rate forecasts. During the last few decades, Israeli monetary policy was strongly in ‡uenced by the USD/ILS exchange rate. Although some new challenges have emerged, the exchange rate still has an impact on the monetary policy decision process. Thus, when policymakers evaluate the future path of the Israeli economy and consider the exchange rate (market-based and expert) forecasts, they should also consider the current terrorism situation to avoid biased or low predictive abilities of the forecasts they use.
Risk matters when considering breakeven in ‡ation as a measure of expectations to some degree. 39 That said, terrorism still seems to a¤ect the actual underlying expectation. This result should be considered when the MPC assesses in ‡ation forecasts. When policymakers evaluate the future path of the Israeli in ‡ation and exchange rates, they should give higher weight to expert forecasts during periods of terrorism. However, the encompassing tests suggest that market-based forecasts should not be dismissed entirely but provide some information.
As a conclusion, two practical solutions for the policymaker, concerning decisions using forecasts extracted after terrorist attacks, can be drawn from our …ndings. The …rst solution is to extract and analyze the forecasts published before the terrorist attack and to give it stronger weight in the current decision process. The second solution is, in this con…guration, to prefer expert-based to market based forecasts.
Conclusion
As a small, developed, open economy implementing an in ‡ation-targeting monetary policy under the situation of …nancial and terrorism instability, Israel remains the best laboratory for analyzing in ‡ation and exchange-rate forecasts.
The consequences of terrorist attacks on expert as well as market-based forecasts are absent from the literature.
This study …lls that gap by showing that in ‡ation and exchange-rate forecast errors in Israel were signi…cantly impacted by terrorism over the last 15 years. Moreover, under all types of uncertainties analyzed in this study, expert in ‡ation forecasts are generally better than breakeven (market-based) in ‡ation forecasts.
When considering the number of terrorist attacks, the picture is very clear: whatever the type of in ‡ation forecast, the number of terrorist attacks has the best explanatory power for the relative predictive ability of the forecasts we consider. Both components of market-based in ‡ation forecasts are signi…cantly impacted by terrorism (in ‡ation forecast as well as its risk premium), even if agents are not risk neutral.
We also show that oil and TASE-100 control variables are sometimes found to impact in ‡ation forecasts, a result in line with Bec and De Gaye (2016) , although this …nding depends strongly on the terrorism indicator included in the model.
Exchange-rate forecasts are more strongly impacted by the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks, whatever the quantitative methodology for accounting for them. We relate this to the fact that external market participants in the exchange market give higher weight to attacks in which human lives are lost.
Uncertainty in general and terrorism in particular a¤ects market partic-ipants much more than professional forecasters anticipate. At least in the case of Israel, the weak average performance of market participants seems to be mostly driven by those episodes. Policymakers should pay attention to market-based forecasts and prefer expert forecasts during periods of terrorism. Forecasters' experience and lowfrequency of updating could play a role in their superior predictive ability compared with market-based forecasts.
